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This paper considers a job search model where the environment is not station-
ary along the unemployment spell and where jobs do not last forever. Under this
circumstance, reservation wages can be lower than without separations, as in a
stationary environment, but they can also be initially higher because of the non-
stationarity of the model. Moreover, the time-dependence of reservation wages is
stronger than with no separations.
The model is estimated structurally using Spanish data for the period 1985-
1996. The main …nding is that, although the decrease in reservation wages is the
main determinant of the change in the exit rate from unemployment for the …rst
four months, later on the only e¤ect comes from the job o¤er arrival rate, given
that acceptance probabilities are roughly equal to one.
JEL Classi…cation: C41, J64
Key Words: Job Search, Nonstationarity, Unemployment, Separation prob-
ability, Structural estimation1 Introduction
In the recent past a large amount of research has been carried out about the job
search behavior of unemployed workers. The analysis of unemployment duration
has become an important tool for understanding better the issues behind the
unemployment rate as an aggregate …gure.
The classic labor supply model cannot explain important features of the typ-
ical problem faced by an unemployed worker searching for a job. Job search
models, describing the behavior of unemployed individuals in a dynamic and
u n c e r t a i nw o r l d ,c h a r a c t e r i z eb e t t e rt h e i rs i t u a t i o ni nt h el a b o rm a r k e t .
These models study the problem of an unemployed worker searching for a
new job. Their basic result is that the worker maximizes his expected wealth by
using a stopping strategy based on accepting an o¤er when the o¤ered wage is
e q u a lt oo rh i g h e rt h a nac r i t i c a lv a l u ec a l l e dt h ereservation wage.
A traditional assumption in these models has been stationarity: parameters
determining worker behavior were supposed to be constant over the spell of un-
employment. But this assumption is often at variance with reality. Estimated
reduced-form search models usually result in manifest negative duration depen-
dence of the re-employment probability, even when unobserved heterogeneity is
controlled for (see among others Meyer (1990) for US data, Narendranathan and
Stewart (1993) for UK data, or Bover, Arellano and Bentolila (1997) for Spanish
data). The natural way of taking into account this empirical fact is allowing
for some time-dependence in one or more parameters of the model. Such time
dependence is supported by various observed facts such as the lower number of
o¤ers arriving to long-term unemployed workers or the changes in the personal
situation of or the environment faced by the unemployed worker.
The contribution of this paper is to introduce a new element not considered
before in non-stationary models of search: an exogenous separation probability,
which can represent both …ring or quitting. Under this circumstance the unem-
ployed worker knows that once employed, he can leave or can be compelled to
leave the job and become unemployed again in the future. One of the most in‡u-
ential articles in the …eld of non-stationary job search is Van den Berg (1990). In
this paper, nonstationarity is considered in a very general way but it is assumed
that jobs are hold forever although it is recognized the importance of relaxing
1this assumption. The present paper is the …rst attempt to incorporate the sep-
aration probability to a discrete-time non-stationary search model. It is proved
that this fact makes the reservation wage be more strongly time-dependent than
otherwise. Moreover, in a stationary model, the e¤ect of this separation prob-
ability on reservation wages is always negative. That is, reservation wages are
lower when the separation probability is larger, basically because the future is
discounted at a higher rate. However, when reservation wages change during the
time the worker is unemployed this e¤ect will be proved not to be unique: we
can see lower reservation wages when the separation probability is considered but
also higher ones, at least for the …rst part of the unemployment spell. This result
means that, in some situations, the unemployed worker is choosier at accepting
job o¤ers because he knows that the probability of being separated from the job
is di¤erent from zero. But this only happens at the beginning of the unemploy-
ment spell, when his situation as unemployed is not so bad. As time passes, the
worker wants to be employed as soon as possible because not only he can access
to better conditions once in a job, but also because he internalizes that, even
after a possible separation, his situation as a new unemployed will be better than
the present one.
There is another empirical objective in this paper: to estimate structurally
the non-stationary model using Spanish data for the period 1985-1996. This esti-
mation is carried out using data on unemployment duration and accepted wages.
Moreover, it is reinforced by controlling for unobserved heterogeneity using a mix-
t u r et e c h n i q u ei n s p i r e di nH e c k m a na n dS i n g e r( 1 9 8 4 ) . G i v e nt h a tw eh a v et o
estimate the model allowing for not much heterogeneity, the control for that not
taken into account seems important. Some simulations about the identi…cation
of this model with unobserved heterogeneity and duration dependence have been
carried out. Their results show that given the structure of the estimated model,
the estimation procedure is able to distinguish between these two elements. More-
over, results from Elbers and Ridder (1982) ensure identi…cation if we have more
regressors apart form the duration and the unobserved heterogeneity considered.
This is the case of the present estimation where we obtain marginally signi…cative
e¤ects of unobserved heterogeneity. Two groups of workers are identi…ed, one of
them with much lower unemployment hazard rates.
The main results of the estimation are as follows. First, the predicted un-
2employment hazard rate is increasing up to the fourth month and decreasing
thereafter. The structural estimation indicates that during the …rst four months,
decreasing reservation wages are the main determinant of the hazard rate, but
later on reservation wages are so low that acceptance probabilities are practi-
cally equal to one. Hence, the hazard is equal to the o¤er arrival rate, also
estimated to be decreasing along the unemployment spell. The model predicts
that those workers with access to unemployment bene…ts have a mean expected
unemployment duration of more than four months whereas without such bene…ts
this expected duration is less than three months.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents the non-
stationary job search model with the separation probability, jointly with some
simulation exercises which help us understand better the results of the model.
Section 3 describes the estimation procedure, the data used, and the main results,
and Section 4 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
I consider a standard discrete-time search model (See, for example, Lippman
and McCall, 1976 or Wolpin, 1987) where the parameters are not going to be
stationary but will be allowed to vary with unemployment duration. Its main
characteristics is based on the continuous-time model of Van den Berg (1990),
but I modify it by introducing a probability of being separated from the job, once
employed.1
Consider a discrete-time economy where agents either work receiving a con-
stant wage, w, or are unemployed and searching for a job in each period t.T h e
following conditions are assumed:
(A1) Wage o¤ers at time t are random draws from a distribution function F(w;t)
where w 2 [0;1) and t is the amount of time the agent has been unemployed:2
1The other modi…cation with respect to Van den Berg (1990) is introducing a discrete-
time framework. The reason for departing from continuous time is not only the …nal objective
of estimating the model using discrete data but also to understand better the e¤ect of the
separation rate. Nevertheless, the continuous version of the model is simply the limiting case of
this model. Details on this continuous version can be found in García-Pérez (1998).
2Calendar time is assumed to start at the moment the individual becomes unemployed.
3(A2) Job o¤ers arrive at random intervals following a Poisson process with arrival
rate ®(t) 2 [0;1) de…ned for each period t:
(A3) During the spell of unemployment, the agent has an income b(t) 2 [0;1),
net of search costs: This income can be interpreted as the value of time for
the unemployed worker, and includes, among other things, unemployment
bene…ts and non-labor income.
(A4) When an o¤er is accepted, the agent works at the o¤ered wage, w; but there
is a constant separation probability ± 2 [0;1]:3
(A5) F(w;t);®(t) and b(t) are continuous functions of t:4
(A6) The individual has a constant subjective discount rate r 2 [0;1):
(A7) There exists some period T such that all the parameters depending on
unemployment duration are constant on [T;1).
These assumptions ensure the appropriate present values are well de…ned and,
therefore, guarantee the existence of an optimal strategy.
The expected present value of future net income for an unemployed worker




[®(t)Ew;t+1 max(W(w);U(t +1 ) )+( 1¡ ®(t))U(t +1 ) ] (1)
Thus, U(t) is the value of unemployment time, b(t); received at the beginning
of the period, plus the expected and discounted value of the optimal stopping
decision at t+1: T h i se x p e c t e dv a l u ei s ,i nt h ec a s ea no ¤ e ra r r i v e si np e r i o dt,5
the maximum between the expected present value of accepting the o¤er;W(w);
a n dc o n t i n u i n gt os e a r c ho n em o r ep e r i o d ,U(t +1 ) : If no o¤er arrives; then the
worker will have the value of being unemployed at period t +1 ;U (t +1 ) :
Thus, t refers both to calendar time and to the length of time over which the individual remains
unemployed.
3That is, the job can be interrupted for whichever exogenous reason, for example, …ring or
quitting.
4These parameters can also be step functions of duration, as in Van den Berg (1990).
5I assume that this o¤er is received at the end of the period so that we have to apply the
time discount factor to its expected value.





[(1 ¡ ±)W(w)+±U(0)] (2)
That is, W(w) i st h ev a l u eo ft h ew a g er e c e i v e di np e r i o dt plus the expected
present value of what can happen in period t +1:with probability 1 ¡ ±; the
worker will continue employed and with the opposite probability the worker will
leave the job and return to unemployment, where he will have a duration of zero
periods, U(0):
In this context, like in all job search models, every time an o¤er arrives the
decision has to be made whether to accept or to reject it and search further. The
individual will be indi¤erent between working and searching one more period for














Taking into account that U(0) =
(1+r)wR(0)
r ; i.e. the value of U(t) when
t =0 , and substituting (3) in (1) we obtain the following di¤erence equation for













where ¢wR(t)=wR(t +1 )¡ wR(t): It is straightforward to show that wR(0)
satis…es:









From (4) we can distinguish four terms in the reservation wage: (i) the value
of time for the unemployed worker, b(t); (ii) the value associated with a future
job separation, given by the di¤erence between income in period t and the value
6If we take the separation probability to be equal to zero, this equation is the same as in Van
den Berg (1990) but in discrete time.
5of being again at period 0 of the following unemployment spell; (iii) the ex-
pected discounted bene…t associated with the arrival of a new o¤er; and, (iv) the
appreciation or depreciation of the option represented by the reservation wage.
Given the expression of the reservation wage, equation (4), we can obtain the
probability of exiting unemployment in t; conditional on not having exited before,
the hazard rate, Á(t); w h i c hi sd e … n e da s :
Á(t)=®(t)[1¡ F(wR(t +1 ) ;t)] (6)
that is, the rate at which o¤ers arrive times the probability that a given o¤er
is acceptable. Note that, given (1), where the value of accepting a job o¤er,
arriving at the end of period t, is compared with the expected present value of
being unemployed at time t+1; the acceptance probability in period t is computed
taking into account the reservation wage at time t +1 .7
2.1 Nonstationarity of the reservation wage
The nonstationarity of the reservation wage is derived from the nonstationarity of
the parameters of the model, which is established by the following assumptions:8
(K1) b(t) >b (t +1 ) ; 8t 2 [0;T):
(K2) ®(t) >® (t +1 ) ; 8t 2 [0;T):
(K3) F(w;t) …rst order stochastically dominates F(w;t +1 ) ; 8t 2 [0;T); which
implies that 1 ¡ F(w;t) > 1 ¡ F(w;t+1 ) ; 8w 2 [0;1):
(K4) F(w;t) is a mean preserving spread of F(w;t +1 ) ;8t 2 [0;T); that is,







The economic meaning of these assumptions is simple. The value of time for
an unemployed worker decreases with unemployment duration because his income
7This is a consequence of discrete time. In continuous time, see García-Pérez (1998), this
acceptance probability would just be 1 ¡ F(wR(t);t):
8The derivation of the nonstationarity of the reservation wage is similar to Van den Berg
(1990) but in discrete time.
6and unemployment bene…ts decline over time. The o¤er arrival rate and the wage
o¤ered become smaller as time proceeds, as a result of the stigma e¤ect that long-
term unemployed workers may su¤er (see Viswanath, 1989 or Berkovitch, 1990).
The distribution of o¤ers can be more concentrated around its mean for the
long-term unemployed, because they may know more about this distribution (see
Burdett and Viswanath, 1988). An important assumption is that people know
how the parameters are related to the duration of unemployment.
The time dependence exhibited by the reservation wage is obtained in the
following theorem, where it is helpful to use what I call a stationary reservation
wage, w0
R(t). This wage is the optimal reservation wage at time t; for all t ¸ 0;




















Theorem 1 Let assumptions (A1) to (A7) be satis…ed. Let one or more param-
eters satisfy assumptions (K1)-(K4) with strict inequality, while the remaining
ones are constant over the time interval [0;1): Then:
(i) wR(t) <w 0
R(t);
(ii) ¢wR(t) < 0:
Proof : See Appendix A.
The meaning of this result is simple: any future decrease in the parameters of
the model makes the value of search in the present be smaller than it would be,
if the parameters were constant. So the unemployed worker, anticipating these
future changes, sets a smaller reservation wage as his spell of unemployment
lengthens.
2.2 The e¤ect of the separation probability
In stationary search models (see, for example, Devine and Kiefer, 1991) the e¤ect
of the separation rate on reservation wages is negative. Given that the future is
more risky, future opportunities are discounted at a higher rate and, thus, the
reservation wage is lower. This is because the value of being employed is lower
when jobs do not last forever. Given this, the value of being unemployed is also
7l o w e ra n dt h er e s u l ti st h a tt h em i n i m u ma c c e p t a b l ew a g ef o rt h e s ew o r k e r si s
smaller.
However, in the present model, the nonstationarity of the search process in-
troduces a new element at play: being separated from a job is not the same thing
when considered by an unemployed worker at the beginning of the unemployment
spell as after, for example, one year of unemployment. This fact can be con…rmed
by analyzing equation (4). The e¤ect of the separation probability is not only
direct, via the presence of ± in the expression for wR(t); but also indirect because
of its e¤ect on wR(0): Hence, in order to obtain the e¤ect of the separation prob-
ability we need a general expression for wR(t) a saf u n c t i o no n l yo fe x o g e n o u s
parameters.
This can be obtained by taking into account that equation (4) determines a
system of T +1equations on reservation wages from period 0 to period T.I f
we work backwards in this system, we can …rstly obtain an expression for wR(0);
and after substituting in wR(t); obtain the following general expression for the
reservation wage:
wR(t)=( r + ±)PV(b(t)) +PV(E(w,t)) ¡
±D(t)
1+±D(0)


































































That is, the reservation wage at time t is the present discounted value, PV (¢),
of (r+±)b(t)+®(t)
R 1
wR(t+1) wdF(w;t) from period t to T minus a fraction of this
present discounted value but from period 0 to T:In these actual discounted values,
the discount factor involves all the parameters of the model via the unemployment
hazard rate, Á(t): Hence, this expression takes into account both a time discount,
r, and a probability discount, via the hazard rate. The latter considers whether
t h ew o r k e rw i l lb eu n e m p l o y e do rn o ti ne a c hp e r i o dc o n s i d e r e d .
8Before discussing the sign of the derivative of wR(t) with respect to ±,w ec a n
realize of the following useful result.
Lemma 2 If b(t) is decreasing, the derivative of wR(t) with respect to ± is also
decreasing in t.




















D(t) is a weighted average of the values of b(t) from period t to T
and b(t) is decreasing in t,
PV(b(t))
D(t) is decreasing in t. But this mean that
dwR(t)
d± will be also decreasing in t because the other terms in this derivative
are constant in t. Q.E.D.
Given this result, we can easily prove a general result for the sign of the deriva-
tive of wR(t) with respect to ±: This is established in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The e¤ect of the separation rate on the reservation wage at period
t;
dwR(t)



























Proof : Given the result of the previous Lemma, in order to have that
dwR(t)
d± · 0; a
su¢cient condition is that this derivative at time 0 is negative. This su¢cient
condition is satis…ed if and only if, evaluating
dwR(t)























9I nt h eo p p o s i t ec a s e ,
dwR(0)
d± ¸ 0 and it will continue being positive until
period t¤; where the second expression in the proposition is veri…ed. For all
periods after t¤; the derivative will be negative. Q.E.D.
This proposition tells us that in a non-stationary environment, the e¤ect of
the separation probability on reservation wages is not always negative. If the
weighted average of b(t) from period 0 to T,
PV(b(0))
D(0) ; is high enough with respect
to the present value of expected wages, we can …nd a positive initial e¤ect which
lasts for t¤ periods. This is totally new and di¤erent to a stationary environment:
when the parameters of the model change with the time the worker is unemployed,
a higher separation wage can provoke the reservation wage to be higher instead
of lower. That is, in presence of a positive separation probability, the worker
may be choosier at the beginning of the unemployment spell and this is so when
he enjoys a much better situation that it is expected to have in a possible job.
However, as time passes, the worker realizes that his income or his chances of a
new o¤er will be lower. But, he also knows that if he is hired, then in the case
of a future separation, he will have access to greater values of all the parameters
of the model. This fact provokes that the reservation wage decreases very fast as
time passes.9
But, the separation probability a¤ects also the time dependence of the reser-
vation wage. The following proposition tells us that when the unemployed worker
considers a future possibility of being unemployed, reservation wages will be even
more negatively time dependent.
Proposition 4 If b(t) is decreasing, a higher separation probability will make a
negative time dependence of reservation wages be even more negative.
Proof : As ¢wR(t)=wR(t+1 )¡wR(t), substituting each reservation wage by its












9Of course, this e¤ect comes from assuming that the situation at the beginning of the un-
employment spell is the same whatever the duration of the previous job was. This is clearly
at odds with the observed fact that, for example, unemployment bene…ts depend on the length
of the previous job and on its associated wage. However, given the di¢culty of controlling for
these aspects, I omit them in the analysis.
10Given that 8t 2 [T;1) we have that ¢wR(t)=0 ; then
d¢wR(T)
d± =0




1+r < 0 because b(t) is decreasing.
Therefore, we have that a higher separation probability increases the negative






< 0 8t 2 [0;T): Q:E:D:
Hence, the worker’s requirements for accepting job o¤ers will be even more de-
creasing given that he can be unemployed in the future. This fact will make that
acceptance probabilities increase quickly along the unemployment spell. More-
over, they can be equal to one very soon in the unemployment spell for certain
values of the model’s parameters.
I have carried out some simulations with the model in order to determine
when we observe positive or negative e¤ects of the separation probability over
the reservation wage. In these simulations I have combined …ve possible values
for each of the parameters in the model and I have calculated reservation wages
in each of these combinations. As we saw in Proposition 3, all the parameters
of the model determine whether we obtain a positive or negative e¤ect, but the
main feature in order to obtain an initial positive e¤ect is that the mean of
the distribution of wages has to be low enough with respect to the value of
unemployment time. This is con…rmed with these exercises, whose results are in
Figure 1. Given the values used in the simulations, the level of the parameter
b(t) at period 0 has to be at least 40% larger than the mean o¤ered wage in
order to obtain an initially positive e¤ect of the separation rate. The coe¢cient
of variation of o¤ered wages is also very important. The larger is this coe¢cient,
the higher has to be b(0) with respect to the mean o¤ered wage in order to observe
a positive e¤ect of the separation probability on reservation wages at time zero.
The remaining parameters, the e¤ects of ®(t) and the time dependence of b(t)
are also shown in this …gure, play a much smaller role in the determination of
t h es i g no ft h i sd e r i v a t i v e .
Hence, to conclude, I have studied the e¤ect of the separation probability on
non-stationary reservation wages and I have obtained that this analysis changes
the results substantially with respect to the stationary case. Not only we can
obtain a positive sign in the derivative of reservation wages with respect to the
separation probability, but also I have found that the time dependence of the
11reservation wage will be even more negative when the probability of being sepa-
rated from the job is larger.
3 Structural estimation
The estimation of the previous model is performed with Spanish data: the Span-
ish Continuous Family Expenditure Survey (Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos
Familiares (ECPF)) for the period 1985-1996. The ECPF i sar o t a t i n gp a n e l
which interviews about 3,200 households every quarter. One eighth of the sam-
ple is renewed quarterly and hence an individual can be followed for a maximum
of two consecutive years. This source gives information on unemployed workers
over their spells of unemployment and on their post-unemployment wages, in
addition to information on consumption and other household characteristics.
T h ee s t i m a t i o ns a m p l ei sc o m p o s e do fu n e m p l o y e dh o u s e h o l dh e a d s ,w h o
are the only group for which the educational level is reported. Also, I restrict
the sample to married men to reduce heterogeneity, since, given the estimation
procedure, I am not able to introduce many regressors in the estimation.
The individuals in the sample are all entrants to unemployment. The observed
spells can be either complete, if the worker exits from unemployment or censored,
if he does not. For the complete spells, the re-employment wage is computed for
those who continue answering the survey two quarters after the unemployment
spell ends, from the labor income of the second quarter of employment. The
reason for doing this is to reduce measurement error about the amount, which is
simply quarterly income (see Appendix B).
As we can see in Table 1, there are 869 completed spells of unemployment and
698 censored spells. Of the former, 446 have an observed re-employment wage.
The shape of the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the hazard rate and the histogram of
re-employment wages, which are expressed in real terms of December 1996, can
be seen in Figures 2 and 3, respectively.
Although the ECPF is a quarterly survey, it is possible to calculate monthly
values of the variables. Monthly data are preferred because they will re‡ect better
the nonstationarity of the job search behavior. Indeed, with monthly data the
changing patterns of the parameters are likely to be estimated better.10 In order
10Hence, the time period in our discrete-time model is one month. This length could be quite
12to obtain monthly data, a few transformation rules, explained in Appendix B,
have been applied.
The model has been estimated structurally using the monthly data described
before and the assumption made in Appendix C that wages are lognormal.11 But
the di¢culties in the process of estimation make other simplifying assumptions
necessary.
Estimation involves solving for the reservation wages of each worker at each
evaluation of the likelihood function. However, it is computationally very time
consuming to solve for each worker. The solution I have adopted is to restrict
the heterogeneity of the sample and to build types of workers based on a few
dichotomous variables.
In the results I present, there are three explanatory variables which are used
both for predicting their e¤ect on hazard rates and also for identifying better the
parameters of the model. Skill, which is measured by the level of education: a
skilled worker is one with education equal to or above secondary. Age, divided
in three groups (less than 30 years old, Age1830; between 30 and 45 years old,
Age3045; and more than 45 years old, Age4565). Finally, I use a variable which
indicates if the individual has access to unemployment bene…ts or not, Bene…ts.12
In the estimation, a monthly discount rate of 0.3% (i.e. a 3.66% annual rate)
was imposed and not estimated and T was set to 24 months in calculating the …nal
condition for the reservation wage. Di¤erent discount rates have been used and
long for some economies, what could create problems in the estimation of the o¤er arrival rate.
However, I think this is not a problem for Spain where the duration in unemployment is long
enough to imply monthly o¤er arrival rates lower than one.
11It is well-known that not all wage o¤er distribution function satis…es the recoverability
condition which is crucial for identifying the model (See Flinn and Heckman, 1982). One function
which satis…es it is the lognormal and this is the main reason for choosing it. Moreover, this
function works well also in Wolpin (1987) and …ts the empirical distribution of accepted wages
(See Figure 3).
12This variable requires further comment. It indicates not only whether the unemployed
worker actually receives unemployment bene…ts or not, but also whether he has received them.
The basic idea behind this distinction is that workers who have accumulated and used their
entitlement to unemployment bene…ts have a di¤erent behavior in their search process than
those without those rights. However, the empirical motivation for this distinction is di¤erent:
to correctly estimate the e¤ect of bene…ts on a structural estimation, we would need to know
the complete sequence of bene…t receipt over the spell of unemployment of each worker, both
for workers with or without a complete spell. This requirement is clearly far from being satis…ed
with the data used. So, we have to follow an intermediate solution which leads to obtain a not
fully structural e¤ect of unemployment bene…ts.
13the estimations results change only marginally. With respect to the separation
probability, instead of estimating it which could be di¢cult to identify given no
data on employment spells, I have used a previously estimated value, obtained
from García-Pérez (1997), for each group of workers in the estimation procedure.
The mean separation probability for the estimation sample is 4.99% per month,
being higher for unskilled and young workers.
Now, the way the structural model is estimated and some issues of identi…ca-
tion are explained. After this, the results are presented and discussed.
3.1 The likelihood function
There are not many papers estimating structurally dynamic programming models
of individual behavior. In the search context some references are Lancaster and
Chesher (1983), Miller (1984) or Narendranathan and Nickell (1985). But one
of the most in‡uential articles in this area, which is the basis for the maximum
likelihood estimation in this paper, is Wolpin (1987). This paper develops a
discrete-time model of search which is non-stationary because of a …nite horizon
of search. It is estimated by maximum likelihood using data on duration, accepted
wages and a few individual characteristics.
The estimation presented here is clearly inspired in Wolpin’s technique but
it contains a new element: unobserved heterogeneity. I will …rst explain the
likelihood function without unobserved heterogeneity, and, afterwards, we will
see the one which controls for its presence.
In the sample of unemployed workers there exist three types of individuals:
those with complete spells and an observed re-employment wage, those with com-
plete spells but without an observed re-employment wage and …nally, those with
censored spells. Thus, the likelihood function will have three di¤erent compo-










+(1 ¡ vi)ln(Pr(Ti = t))
¤
13vi is an indicator variable which takes a value of 1 if the re-employment wage of worker i is
observed and zero otherwise. ci is an indicator of censoring: it takes a value of 1 if the individual
i has a complete spell and zero otherwise. Ti represents worker i’s unemployment spell duration
and Woi is his observed re-employment wage. Finally, yit is equal to one if the individual i has
his last observation, di; at period t.









ciyit [vi ln(fWo(Woj t)Ái(t))+(1 ¡ vi)ln(Ái(t))]
+(1 ¡ ciyit)ln(1¡Ái(t))
Given this likelihood function and taking into account the reservation wage,
equation (4), we can estimate the parameters of the model, ®(t);b (t);± ; ¹ W; ¾u
and ¾" provided they are all identi…ed.
The general idea behind identi…cation is the following: given data on accepted
wages, along with data on unemployment duration, the parameters of the wage
o¤er distribution, ¹ W;¾u and ¾" are clearly identi…ed in the …rst component of
the likelihood function. Further, given that, for some workers the acceptance
probability is equal to one due to the e¤ect of the separation probability, I can
identify the o¤er arrival rate in both the second and the third components of the
likelihood function. Finally, the separation probability, ±;a n dt h ev a l u eo ft i m ef o r
unemployed workers, b(t); are identi…ed making use of the system of reservation
wages from 0 to T: However, the distinction between these two parameters can
be quite poor without data on previous employment spells’ durations or data on
the value of unemployment time. Therefore, we will estimate the model imposing
some previously estimated values for the separation probability.
3.1.1 The likelihood function with unobserved heterogeneity
The requirement of restricting the heterogeneity in the sample implies that a lot
of sample heterogeneity is not captured by the explanatory variables used. This
problem together with the fact that unobserved heterogeneity generates spurious
negative duration dependence in the estimation, motivates the consideration and
estimation of unobserved heterogeneity in the hazard rate.
Although unobserved heterogeneity can not be controlled by a …xed e¤ect
approach, because we do not have multiple spells, I can apply a random e¤ect
technique as it has been used, for example, in Flinn and Heckman (1982). In
order not to restrict more the estimation procedure, we are going to estimate
nonparametrically the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity, with a technique
inspired in that of Heckman and Singer (1984).
As we want to separate the e¤ect of unemployment duration from that of un-
15observed heterogeneity, this element is introduced in the two parameters where
duration dependence is allowed: the o¤er arrival rate and the value of unem-
ployment time. It is the same unobserved heterogeneity distribution but with a
possibly di¤erent e¤ect on both parameters. Note that the e¤ect of this hetero-
geneity is the same for each individual, who has so many likelihood contributions
as the length of his unemployment spell. Hence, having this unobserved hetero-
geneity term in two di¤erent parameters facilitates its identi…cation.







where F(´) is the cumulative distribution function of ´; which is a discrete func-
tion with two mass points, ´1 and ´2:14 These mass points are selected in order
to verify the assumption of E(´)=0which is necessary given the presence of
a constant term in the two parameters where unobserved heterogeneity is intro-
duced. Besides, it is estimated the probability p for the variable ´ to be equal to
its value ´1:
The function Li(´) is the likelihood function described in the previous sub-
section, where its arguments are all functions of the unobserved heterogeneity
variable, ´:
The addition of unobserved heterogeneity as a two mass point distribution
function adds a new dichotomous variable to the estimation procedure. Hence,
we have twenty-four types of workers (twelve in the case without unobserved
heterogeneity), so I have to compute reservation wages these times for each eval-
uation of the likelihood function.
To understand to what extent we can jointly identify the e¤ect of unobserved
heterogeneity and duration dependence in the unemployment hazard rate, I have
carried out some simulations. I have generated forty random samples of 500
workers with some binary variables as those present in our data set15 and I have
14I have used just two mass points in the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity. It is
known that increasing the number of mass points could be a way of improving the control for
unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, a promising avenue for improving our control for unob-
served heterogeneity in structural models will be to study how the estimation results change as
the number of mass points increases. This exercise could be complementary to that of Baker
and Melino (2000) but it is left for future research.
15These variables are included, respectively, in the o¤er arrival rate, the mean of o¤ered wages
and in the value of unemployment time.
16applied to them the estimation procedure previously described. For those exer-
cises which deal with the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the o¤er arrival
rate and the value of unemployment time, one of the generated binary variables
in these parameters is dropped and assumed to be the unobserved heterogeneity.
The …rst conclusion emerging from these simulations, see Table 2, is that
almost all parameters are well identi…ed given typical signi…cance levels.
With respect to the introduction of unobserved heterogeneity, I have ob-
tained that the estimation procedure identi…es its presence and its di¤erential
e¤ect with respect to duration dependence. That is, when the o¤er arrival
rate is parameterized as 1 ¡ exp(¡exp(¡1 ¡ 0:14t)) for half the population and
1 ¡ exp(¡exp(¡0:6 ¡ 0:14t)) for the other half, the estimation procedure makes
the duration dependence coe¢cient to be, on average, ¡0:144 with a mean stan-
dard error of 0:023. The same happens for the time dependence of the value
of unemployment time: its true value is ¡0:1 and its mean estimated value is
¡0:129 with a mean standard error of 0:048. The probability of the unobserved
heterogeneity distribution, which is equal to 0.5 when generating the data, is es-
timated to be, on average, 0:568 with a mean standard error of 0:259.H o w e v e r ,
the results with respect to its level and its di¤erential e¤ect over the value of
unemployment time are poor: the mean estimated values are close to the real
ones but the standard errors of both parameters are quite high.
Hence, we conclude from these simulation results that the structure of the
model, basically the di¤erent regressors we have in each parameter of the model,
helps to identify the model. This is also what is obtained in Elbers and Ridder
(1982) but for a proportional hazard model. In order to di¤erentiate duration
dependence from the e¤ect of unobserved heterogeneity we need other regressors
in the parameter where they are included. This is our identifying strategy in the
following estimation.
The selected functional forms for the parameters of the model are shown in
Table 3. The o¤er arrival rate, ®(t); is parameterized using the extreme value
distribution function. The idea is to use a proportional assumption for the un-
derlying continuous o¤er arrival rate. It is well known, see Meyer (1990), that in
discrete time, a continuous proportional hazard rate follows this distribution. I
want to use a proportional form for this arrival rate in order to identify separately
the e¤ect of unobserved heterogeneity from that of the duration of unemployment
17(see Elbers and Ridder’s (1982)). The other parameters are assumed to be ex-
ponential because of the assumption of lognormal wages, in order to reduce their
scale or to restrict them to be non-negative.
With respect to the parameterization of the o¤er arrival rate, I distinguish
between people with and without access to unemployment bene…ts. It may be
argued that the access to unemployment bene…ts should not only make the value
of time for the unemployed worker to be di¤erent, but also his search e¤ort,
re‡ected in the o¤er arrival rate, although not modelled here, should di¤er from
that of workers without bene…ts. We have to remember that this variable is not
unemployment bene…ts. It is just an indicator of wether the worker has access to
them or not. Estimates without this indicator in the o¤er arrival rate are much
poorer in terms of likelihood values and signi…cance of the rest of parameters.
3.2 Results
The main results of the structural estimation can be seen in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4 shows the estimated coe¢cients of the model both when unobserved
heterogeneity is and is not controlled for. Table 5 reports the predicted values
o ft h em a i ne l e m e n t si nt h em o d e le s t i m a t e d ,f o rt h es a m p l em e a nv a l u e so ft h e
regressors and both for skilled and unskilled workers and for workers with and
without access to unemployment bene…ts. It also presents the main predictions
for the two estimated groups with respect to unobserved heterogeneity.
The …rst result shown in Table 4 is that the presence of unobserved het-
erogeneity in the data cannot be rejected (the likelihood ratio of a test of no
unobserved heterogeneity has a value of 11.451 with a p-value lower than 0.005).
Hence, there is unobserved heterogeneity in the data but we con…rm from this
table that its control does not a¤ect to the duration dependence of the two pa-
rameters where it is considered. As the model which controls for unobserved
heterogeneity is more general, we discuss thereafter its results.
Duration dependence is estimated in the o¤er arrival rate, ®(t); a n di nt h e
value of time for unemployed workers, b(t): We can observe that there is a strong
negative duration dependence in both parameters: a 2.69% monthly decrease
in b(t) and a 13.87% mean monthly decrease in ®(t) which is a much higher
rate than the 2.5% found in Wolpin (1987) for the o¤er arrival rate with US
data. Furthermore, both parameters are highly signi…cant despite unobserved
18heterogeneity being controlled for.
With respect to the skill variable, we can see that it is marginally signi…cant
in both the o¤er arrival rate and in mean o¤ered wages. There are more o¤ers
f o rs k i l l e du n e m p l o y e dw o r k e r s ,a si nV a nd e nB e r g( 1 9 9 0 ) ,a n dt h eo ¤ e r e dw a g e s
are quite higher for these workers. The same result is obtained in Wolpin (1987).
The e¤ect of having access to unemployment bene…ts is very strong. Not only
is the value of time for the unemployed worker higher for those with such bene…ts,
but also the o¤er arrival rate is much lower for these workers (see Table 4). These
results might be revealing a lower search e¤ort of this type of workers, re‡ected
in a lower o¤er arrival rate but also in a higher valuation of time. What is
important is that the known stylized fact of lower hazard rates for workers with
unemployment bene…ts can be interpreted much better within this structural
estimation.16
The estimated values of ®(t) and E(w) are quite reasonable: the o¤er arrival
rate at the sample mean values of both the regressors and the e¤ect of unobserved
heterogeneity begins at 41.08% in the …rst month of unemployment and has a
value of only 5.13% fourteen months later. This parameter is higher for skilled
unemployed workers: 48.11% in the …rst month and 6.34% in the fourteenth. The
e s t i m a t e dm e a no fo ¤ e r e dw a g e s ,E(w); at the sample mean of the regressors, is
117,423 pesetas, around 899 dollars per month (at the December 1996 exchange
rate), which is only 7.75% lower than the mean monthly accepted wage in the
sample (see Table 1). Finally, the value of the parameter b(t) is estimated to
be quite high, although it has a rapid decrease over the spell of unemployment.
However, it is still more than 50% larger than both the mean o¤ered wage and the
reservation wage along the studied fourteen months of the unemployment spell.
In Table 5 we have the e¤ect of unobserved heterogeneity in these two parameters.
The estimated distribution of unobserved heterogeneity reveals the existence of
two groups (See Table 4): with 34.7% probability, the workers have both a lower
o¤er arrival rate and a higher value of unemployment time. These two e¤ects of
unobserved heterogeneity make this group of workers to have larger reservation
wages and hence, lower hazard rates. The other 65.3% of the sample has larger
o¤er arrival rates and lower values of unemployment time for all unemployment
16We should not forget, however, that the estimation is not totally structural with respect to
this variable.
19durations. Hence, their reservation wages are lower and their hazard rate larger
than for the …rst group of workers.
There exists a problem with the estimation of the variance of the o¤ered wage
a n do ft h em e a s u r e m e n te r r o r .I nf a c t ,r e a lv a r i a t i o no fo ¤ e r e dw a g e si se s t i m a t e d
to be too low: the estimated fraction of the wage variance accounted for by real
variation of wages is of only 12.63%. Although measurement error is present
in our data, due to the construction procedure, this unexpected result may be
re‡ecting problems of identi…cation which have also appeared in other structural
estimations as, for example, Eckstein and Wolpin (1990). Nevertheless, the total
v a r i a t i o no fw a g e s ,¾u +¾"; is estimated quite well: the coe¢cient of variation of
accepted wages is 39.45% and the estimated coe¢cient of variation of observed
w a g e si s3 4 . 9 1 % .
Estimated reservation wages and hazard rates can be obtained given these
estimated parameters. Reservation wages are decreasing with unemployment du-
ration (See Table 5), as the theoretical model predicts, and higher for skilled
unemployed workers (141,506 pesetas for skilled workers, i.e. 1,083 dollars, and
135,443 pesetas, 1,037 dollars, for the unskilled ones in the …rst month of unem-
ployment). But the main characteristic of reservation wages is that they begin
being quite high although their decreasing pattern is very important along the
fourteen months analyzed: for sample mean values of the regressors, the reserva-
tion wage in the …rst month of unemployment is 15.74% higher than the mean of
the distribution of wages but, after 14 months of unemployment, the reservation
wage is 56.81% lower than it was in the …rst month. The e¤ect of the sepa-
ration probability on reservation wages is present and very important. In fact,
the estimation results show that we are obtaining an initial positive e¤ect of the
separation probability over reservation wages. If we evaluate these results with a
10% higher separation probability, reservation wages are higher for the …rst two
periods in unemployment and lower afterwards.
The estimated low reservation wages lead, as in Van den Berg (1990), to high
acceptance probabilities. It seems that in Spain they are even larger: after 5
m o n t h s ,t h e ya r ep r a c t i c a l l ye q u a lt oo n e( s e eF i g u r e4w h e r ew ed i s t i n g u i s h
between those with and those without access to unemployment bene…ts). How-
ever, the acceptance probability begins at a low level, 7.62% at the beginning
of the spell (opposed to a mean value of 77% in Van den Berg, 1990), basically
20because the o¤er arrival rates are quite high in these …rst months. But it grows
rapidly, reaching the value of one in 5 months for the larger group with respect
to unobserved heterogeneity and in 8 months for the other group of workers.
The …nal result of this estimation is the hazard rate. This rate is the product
of the o¤er arrival rate and the acceptance probability. As shown in Figure 5,
the hazard rate increases until 4 months and then it decreases, becoming equal to
the o¤er arrival rate, as the acceptance probability approaches one. The initial
increase in the hazard is due to the large increase in the acceptance probabilities.
The hazard rates for workers with and without access to unemployment ben-
e…ts are, as shown in Figure 5, very di¤erent. The known stylized fact estimated
in some reduced-form estimations, see García-Perez (1997) or Bover et al. (1997),
is obtained also here: a worker without unemployment bene…ts has higher prob-
abilities of exiting unemployment in all of the fourteen months of the spell which
are studied here. But with the structural estimation carried out, we can interpret
this result and conclude that in the early stage of the spell, the main element at
work is the acceptance probability, which is much larger for those without unem-
ployment bene…ts, but, once this probability is estimated to be equal to one, the
di¤erence between the two groups of workers remains because the o¤er arrival
rate is still quite higher for those without bene…ts.
Figure 6 shows the e¤ect of unobserved heterogeneity on the hazard rates.
As stated above, the estimation identi…es two groups of workers: one with higher
o¤er arrival rates and lower values for b(t); a n dt h u sw i t hm u c hh i g h e rh a z a r d
rates and another group with much lower hazard rates because they have smaller
o¤er arrival rates and higher values for b(t).
If we compute the predicted mean unemployment durations, those with access
to unemployment bene…ts have a larger mean and a much higher probability of
becoming a long-term unemployed, that is, surviving as unemployed for more
than 12 months: their predicted mean is 4.14 months and their predicted survival
probability at 12 months is 25.93% whereas these …gures are, respectively, 2.96
and 7.34% for those workers without access to such bene…ts. I have simulated
the e¤ect of a di¤erent duration of the reception of unemployment bene…ts over
these outcomes of the model. Lengthening unemployment bene…ts entitlement
from 3 to 12 months makes the expected mean duration of unemployment to be
9.17% larger and almost doubles the probability of being long-term unemployed.
21Nevertheless, we have to take with precaution these predictions, given that we
have not used the di¤erent durations of unemployment bene…t reception in the
sample to estimate the model.
To conclude, the estimation of the search model shows that Spanish unem-
ployed workers do not di¤er so much from unemployed workers elsewhere: their
acceptance probabilities are very high except for the …rst four to six months
of unemployment (see Wolpin, 1987 for US data or Van den Berg, 1990 for the
Netherlands). Thus, the main mechanism at play in the process of exit from un-
employment is the arrival of o¤ers from employers. The o¤er arrival rate, in spite
of its initial high value, is very low for workers who are unemployed for more than
12 months, the so-called long-term unemployed. Thus, this group of unemployed
workers, among with the unskilled ones, has serious problems in order to leave
unemployment in Spain.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper presents a non-stationary job search model where jobs do not last
for ever. When the unemployed worker is looking for a new job, he takes into
consideration that once employed he can be unemployed again. This future risk
makes him, normally, reduces his reservation wages because, if he loses his job in
the future, he will be unemployed again. However, given the nonstationarity of
the process, at the beginning of the unemployment spell, the worker can be in a
situation quite good with respect to his expectations for the future. Therefore, we
can also observe higher reservation wages in the …rst steps of the unemployment
spell when the separation rate is larger.
I have implemented a structural estimation of this search model for the Span-
ish economy using data which are observed in discrete intervals of time. Further-
more, the estimation procedure controls for the presence of unobserved hetero-
geneity by using the Heckman and Singer (1984) mixture technique.
One of the basic results of the estimation of the search model is that the
re-employment probability, the hazard rate, is increasing up to the fourth month
of the unemployment spell, but then it becomes clearly decreasing. This result
remains even when we control for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. The
interpretation of this result is that in the …rst months of unemployment, the
22main element at work is the rapid increase of the acceptance probability, given
the highly decreasing pattern of reservation wages. But as soon as these …rst
months pass, the only element present in the hazard rate is the o¤er arrival rate,
because acceptance probabilities are, in fact, equal to one.
As to other results, we obtain that there are some di¤erences between skilled
and unskilled unemployed workers: the o¤er arrival rate and the mean of the dis-
tribution of o¤ered wages are higher for the former. Furthermore, the worker who
receives or has received unemployment bene…ts has a much lower probability of
exiting unemployment. The reason di¤ers between the early stages of unemploy-
ment and the latter ones: at …rst, the reason is that those with unemployment
bene…ts have higher reservation wages and thus, lower acceptance probabilities.
From the fourth month of unemployment onwards, the only di¤erence is in the
o¤er arrival rates, which are much higher for those without unemployment ben-
e…ts, possibly because they have a higher search e¤ort than those without such
bene…ts.
Finally, we can assert that the long-term unemployed, those who are unem-
ployed for more than a year, have very small probabilities of exiting unemploy-
ment: this is estimated to be around 5% per month for the fourteenth month
in unemployment. This result is consistent with the fact that more than 50% of
Spanish unemployed workers are long-term unemployed. Given that the accep-
tance probability is estimated to be equal to one in this stage of unemployment,
we can conclude that long-term unemployed workers do receive almost no o¤ers
once they spend more than a year in unemployment.
23Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
This proof consists of: …rstly, proving the following Lemma which, basically, requires
that ¢w0
R(t) < 0 for (i) and (ii) to hold, and, secondly, proving that ¢w0
R(t) < 0:
Lemma 5 If assumptions (A1)-(A7) are satis…ed and if, for every t 2 [0;T); we have
that ¢w0
R(t) < 0,t h e n :
(i) wR(t) <w 0
R(t);
(ii) ¢wR(t) < 0:
Proof: Suppose that at some t 2 [0;T) wR(t) ¸ w0
R(t) holds. Then, because of
the relationship between wR(t) and w0
R(t) we will have that ¢wR(t) > 0: However,
given that wR(t) and w0
R(t) are continuous functions and, by the Lemma’s assumptions,
¢w0
R(t) < 0; i tc a n n o tb et r u et h a twR(T)=w0
R(T); which must be veri…ed at time
T given the assumptions of the model. Thus, the opposite must hold: wR(t) <w 0
R(t)
a n di m p l i e db yt h i s ,t h a t¢wR(t) < 0:Q : E : D :
N o ww eh a v et op r o v et h a tw0
R(t) is a decreasing function of t under all the assump-
tions (K1)-(K4). The proofs under each of them are quite similar so we will show only
the proof under (K1), i.e. for b(t):
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If b(t) is decreasing in t, the right-hand side of this expression will be positive and








R(t +1 ) ; that is, w0
R(t) is decreasing in the time the worker is
unemployed.
Appendix B
To obtain monthly wages, the labor income and the unemployment bene…ts declared in
the correspondent quarter have been compared. If there are no unemployment bene…ts,
the monthly wage is the declared labor income divided by three. If there are unemploy-
ment bene…ts, their amount is compared with the labor income: if the bene…ts are bigger
24than 80% of the labor income (70% for periods posterior to 1992:2), then the monthly
wage is the total amount declared as labor income. On the contrary, the monthly wage
is the labor income divided by two. This rule is based on the characteristics of the un-
employment bene…ts system in Spain, which lowered the replacement rate from 80% of
the previous wage to 70% in the second quarter of 1992.
Calculation of monthly duration data is more di¢cult. The numbers of months of
unemployment in the spell can be computed once it is established how many months
of unemployment there are in the …rst quarter of unemployment and, if the worker
exits unemployment, how many months he has been employed in the …rst quarter of
employment. The general rule applied to compute the number of unemployment months
in these two quarters is based on comparing the labor income of each quarter, if it is
positive, with the unemployment bene…ts received that quarter or with the labor income
of the following quarter. If there is no labor income in the …rst quarter the individual
answers he is unemployed, it is considered that he is unemployed during all the quarter.
If the reported labor income is low enough a duration of two months is imputed in the
correspondent quarter but if this income is su¢ciently large, it is considered that the
worker has been only one month in unemployment in that quarter.
Appendix C
The likelihood function in equation (9) is based on the relationship between the hazard
rate and the distribution function of a random variable. In a sample of unemployed
workers, those with censored spells or completed spells but without an observed re-
employment wage will have a likelihood contribution which is only a function of the








(1 ¡ Ái(j)) (C2)
For those with completed spells and an observed re-employment wage the likelihood
contribution is the following:
25Pr(Ti = t;Woi)=P r ( Ti = t;Woi j Ti ¸ t)
t¡1 Y
j=0
(1 ¡ Ái(j)) (C3)
where, in period t; this contribution is the joint probability of Ti being equal to t and of
observing the wage Woi:
Here, an assumption about the wage o¤er distribution is needed. Like in other
papers (Van den Berg, 1990 or Wolpin, 1987) it is assumed that wages have a lognormal
distribution. In addition to this, as in Wolpin (1987) and justi…ed by the construction of
t h ew a g ed a t a ,t h er e - e m p l o y m e n tw a g e sa r ea s s u m e dt ob em e a s u r e dw i t he r r o r .T h u s ,
the observed re-employment wage has the following expression:
lnWoi =l n¹ Wi + ui + "i (C4)
where ui is normal with zero mean and variance ¾2
u; and "i; the measurement error, fol-
lows a normal distribution with zero mean and variance ¾2
": I assume that "i is distributed
independently of ui .
The joint distribution of Wo and T j T ¸ t is given by the following equations:
Pr(T = t;Wo j T ¸ t)=fWo(Wo j T = t)Pr(T = t j T ¸ t)=fWo(Wo j t) £ Á(t)
(C5)
Note that the distribution of Wo conditional on t is the truncated distribution of
t h eo b s e r v e dw a g e s ,w i t ht h er e s e r v a t i o nw a g ea tt+1being the truncation point, thus,
fWo (Wo j t)=fWo (Wo j W ¸ WR(t +1 ) ) . For an expression for this density, see
Wolpin (1987).
Finally, we can express the likelihood function in logarithms and in the usual way of
expressing likelihood functions for discrete data (see Jenkins, 1995). This is exactly the
second equation in (9).
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28Table 1
Distribution of unemployment duration and other variables in
the sample
Completed Spells Censored Spells
Number Percentage Mean Accepted Number Percentage
Wage
Months
0-1 88 10.13 95 13.61
1-2 109 12.54 87 12.46
2-3 157 18.07 110 15.76
3-4 162 18.64 58 8.31
4-5 105 12.08 37 5.30
5-6 59 6.79 57 8.17
6-7 39 4.49 18 2.58
7-8 50 5.75 9 1.29
8-9 27 3.11 31 4.44
9-10 21 2.42 24 3.44
10-11 21 2.42 13 1.86
11-12 12 1.38 32 4.58
12-13 11 1.27 17 2.44
13-14 5 0.58 16 2.29
14-15 3 0.35 94 13.47
Age1830 136 15.65 125,788 84 12.03
Age3045 418 48.10 131,546 269 38.54
Skill 63 7.25 153,888 67 9.60
With bene…ts 517 59.49 126,442 460 65.90
TOTAL 869 127,294 698
Note : Mean accepted wages are in 1996 Spanish pesetas (exchange rate:
130.6 pesetas/dollar).
29Table 2
Identi…cation with the estimation procedure: some simulations results
Without unobserved heterogeneity
Coef. a0 a1 a2 a3 e0 e1 v0 b0 b1 b2 b3 r0 °p ´ 1
True -1 -0.14 0.5 0.4 11.5 0.1 -3.4 12.5 -0.1 0.5 -0.2 1 - - -
Estim. -1.06 -0.137 0.55 0.42 11.48 0.10 -3.39 12.40 -0.12 0.69 -0.19 0.98
St. Er. 0.16 0.02 0.14 0.14 0.024 0.03 0.23 0.215 0.04 0.23 0.15 0.32
With unobserved heterogeneity
True -0.8 -0.14 0.5 - 11.5 0.1 -3.4 12.4 -0.1 0.5 - 1 -0.5 0.5 -0.2
Estim. -0.70 -0.143 0.58 11.46 0.09 -3.20 12.26 -0.13 0.80 1.39 -0.28 0.57 -0.40
St. Er. 0.25 0.02 0.26 0.03 0.03 0.25 0.32 0.05 0.35 0.46 1.40 0.26 0.36
Notes : The parameters take the following form:
®(t)=1¡ exp(¡exp(a0 + a1 £ t + a2 £ var2+a3 £ var1));
E(w)=ee0+e2£var2;b (t)=eb0+b1£t+b2£var3+b3£var1;
Va r(w)=ev0;½ 2 =
Va r (w)
Va r (w)+Va r (") = er0
1+er0:
The distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity term is a discrete one with
two mass points. The probability of ´ = ´1 is p: In the estimation with
unobserved heterogeneity, the e¤ect of var1 is dropped and taken as
the one of unobserved heterogeneity. The di¤erential e¤ect of this on
b(t) is measured by the parameter °:
30Table 3
Functional forms of the estimated parameters
Job o¤ers arrival rate:
®(t;´)=1¡ exp(¡exp(¯1 + ¯2 £ dur + ¯3 £ skill + ¯4 £ bene…ts + ´))
Distribution of wages:










¹ W =e x p( ¯5 + ¯6 £ skill + ¯7 £ age1830 + ¯8 £ age3045)
¾2
u =e x p( ¯9)
¾2
" =e x p( ¯10)
V a l u eo ft i m ef o rt h eu n e m p l o y e dw o r k e r :
b(t)=e x p( ¯11 + ¯12 £ dur + ¯13 £ bene…ts + ¯14 £ ´)
31Table 4
Main results of the structural estimation
without Unob. Het. with Unob. Het.
Parameter Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio
®i(t;´)
Constant -0.754 -6.014 -0.442 -2.784
Duration -0.139 -8.513 -0.165 -6.742
Skill 0.152 0.839 0.237 1.554
Bene…ts -0.539 -4.340 -0.296 -1.934
¹ Wi
Constant 11.659 458.986 11.652 480.729
Skill 0.035 1.226 0.058 1.617
Age18-29 -0.014 -0.789 -0.001 -0.052
Age30-45 0.032 1.747 0.039 2.020
¾2
u
Constant -5.996 -5.907 -6.302 -6.806
¾2
"
Constant -2.178 -32.471 -2.179 -33.112
bi(t)
Constant 12.064 85.451 12.083 83.947
Duration -0.028 -2.582 -0.027 -3.085
Bene…ts 0.246 2.093 0.267 2.228





No. of observ. 8,520 8,520
32Table 5
Predicted values for the main elements of the model
t ®(¢) Á(¢) ¹ F (wR(¢)) wR(¢) b(¢)
Mean values for all variables:
0 41:08 3:13 7:62 135;902 219;667
4 23:99 18:12 75:53 117;809 196;943
14 5:13 5:13 100:00 58;691 149;892
For the group with ´1 :
0 32:00 0:00 0:00 151;919 270;079
4 18:04 1:66 9:20 129;070 242;140
14 3:79 3:79 100:00 84;351 184;291
For the group with ´1 :
0 45:90 4:79 10:44 127;390 192;878
4 27:16 26:86 98:89 111;825 172;925
14 5:87 5:87 100:00 45;054 131;612
With access to Unempl. Bene…ts:
0 38:94 1:27 3:26 140;489 234;107
4 22:57 16:11 71:38 121;249 209;889
14 4:79 4:79 100:00 65;929 159;745
Without access to Unempl. Bene…ts:
0 48:36 11:89 24:59 125;874 179;213
4 29:06 28:48 98:00 111;019 160;674
14 6:38 6:38 100:00 38;772 122;288
Skilled workers:
0 48:11 3:25 6:75 141;506 219;667
4 28:88 21:50 74:45 124;879 196;943
14 6:34 6:34 100:00 62;535 149;892
Unskilled workers:
0 40:49 3:11 7:68 135;443 219;667
4 23:60 17:80 75:42 117;237 196;943
14 5:04 5:04 100:00 58;504 149;892
Notes : ¹ F (wR(¢)) = 1 ¡ F (wR(¢)): The …rst three columns are percentages
a n dt h eo t h e rt w oa r ee x p r e s s e di n1 9 9 6p e s e t a s .T h ep r e d i c t i o n sa r e
carried out using the model with unobserved heterogeneity.











































































Note: The baseline parameters in each graph are b(t)=b0 ¤ exp(b1 ¤ t)
= 100 ¤exp(¡0:03t);® (t)=0 :3¤exp(¡0:05t);E (w)=1 5 0 ;C V(w)=
40%;±=2 % :































Figure 3: Histogram of the reemployment wages
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